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Bruce P. Archibald*  Labour Law as a Subset of Employment
 Law?  Up-dating Langille’s Insights with a
 Capabilities Approach
Brian Langille’s influential 1981 article entitled “Labour Law is a Subset of Employment 
Law” is evaluated in the light of changes in the economic, social and political context 
since its publication and the shifts in the appropriate normative underpinnings for 
such an exercise. Langille’s conceptually radical original version of a unified field for 
legal governance of the workplace, rooted in liberal constitutional principles, has been 
accepted in the interim by many. However, four decades later, this schema is no longer 
an adequate basis for responding to challenges for achieving fairness and justice in a 
world of precarious employment, globally organized supply chains creating fissured 
workplaces and increasing levels of inequality. In the meantime, Langille, responding 
to these new circumstances, has moved to a vision of regulating work in accordance 
with a capabilities approach to the deployment of human capital. This principle should 
give workers greater freedom to chose to live lives they have reason to value. The 
question is: what are the real prospects for implementation of these optimistic notions 
for governing life at work?
L’article influent de Brian Langille de 1981 intitulé « Labour Law is a Subset of 
Employment Law » est examiné à la lumière des changements survenus dans les 
contextes économique, social et politique depuis sa publication ainsi que des 
nouveaux fondements normatifs appropriés pour un tel exercice. La version originale, 
conceptuellement radicale, de Langille d’un domaine unifié pour la gouvernance juridique 
du lieu de travail, enracinée dans les principes constitutionnels libéraux, a été acceptée 
depuis lors par beaucoup de gens. Cependant, quatre décennies plus tard, ce schéma 
ne constitue plus une base adéquate pour répondre aux défis en matière d’équité 
et de justice dans un monde d’emplois précaires, de chaînes d’approvisionnement 
organisées à l’échelle mondiale créant des lieux de travail fragmentés et des niveaux 
d’inégalité croissants. Entre-temps, Langille, répondant à ces nouvelles circonstances, 
a adopté une vision de la réglementation du travail selon une approche du déploiement 
du capital humain fondée sur les capacités. Ce principe devrait donner aux travailleurs 
une plus grande liberté de choisir de vivre des vies qu’ils ont des raisons d’apprécier. 
La question est la suivante : quelles sont les perspectives réelles de mise en œuvre de 
ces notions optimistes pour régir la vie au travail?
* Professor Emeritus, Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law.
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Introduction
I. Langille’s original vision of “labour law as a subset of employment 
law”
II. Four decades of mixed evolution in Canadian labour and 
employment law
III. Going beyond standard employment and toward a capabilities/
human freedom approach to the normative foundations for regulating 
personal work relations
IV. Langille’s normative turn to the capabilities approach to human 
development and its implications for his claim that labour law is a 
subset of employment law
Conclusion
In 1981, near the beginning of the end of the post-World War II commitment 
of Western liberal democracies to the full-blown welfare state,1 Brian 
Langille’s  path breaking essay entitled “Labour Law is a Subset of 
Employment Law” was published in the University of Toronto Law 
Journal.2 It had a lasting and positive impact on the way law teachers, legal 
scholars and some practitioners conceptualized the academic and practical 
discipline devoted to the understanding of how the Canadian legal system 
organizes and regulates activity at work.3 Until that perceptive article’s 
appearance, most observers had accepted that employment relations in 
1. See Allan Moscovitch & Jim Albert, eds, The “Benevolent” State: the Growth of Welfare in 
Canada (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1987); Thomas J Courchene, Social Canada in the Millennium: 
Reform Imperatives and Restructuring Principles (Toronto: CD Howe Institute, 1994). Note the widely 
repeated French notion of the “Thirty Glorious Years” of the welfare state following the Second World 
War: Jean Fourastié’s Les Trente Glorieuses, ou la révolution invisible de 1946 à 1975 (Paris: Fayard, 
1979) at 300 (Rééd. Hachette Pluriel no 8363). See also Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First 
Century (Cambridge: Belknap/Harvard University Press, 2014) at 96-99.
2. (1981) 31 UTLJ 200 [Langille, “Subset”].
3. See The Labour Law Casebook Group, Labour and Employment Law: Cases, Materials and 
Commentary, 9th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2018), which goes back to the mid-1970s but which, 
for many successive editions, has been organized in accordance with the principle that “labour law 
is a subset of employment law.” The current editorial group includes 20 professors of labour and 
employment law from across the country, and historically has involved most of the leading labour law 
scholars in Canada.
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Canada’s workplaces were governed by two alternative sets of legal rules: 
(a) employment law, rooted in the common law of “master and servant,” 
with an increasingly important overlay of statutory labour standards, 
regulating individual employees4; and (b) labour law, patterned on the 
American “Wagner Act Model,” regulating unionized employees under 
a highly decentralized system of workplace union certification.5 Both of 
these regulatory schemes were built upon what came to be known as the 
“standard contract of employment” (ie full-time, long-term employment 
by, usually, male, family breadwinners).6 Langille effectively debunked 
this simplistic and inaccurate traditional bifurcation between labour 
and employment law, at least in the eyes of the scholarly community 
(even if its debilitating influence continues in the world of practice 
driven by convenient, if mindless, adherence to precedent). Of course, 
Langille’s analysis applied to the “industrial sector” in an economic world 
increasingly dominated by vertically and horizontally integrated multi-
national corporations,7 where union density in the private sector in Canada 
had attained roughly 30 per cent,8 and in an intellectual world where 
mainstream socio-legal normative analysis in western constitutional 
democracies was coming heavily under the healthy liberal influence of 
Rawls,9 and Dworkin.10 
In the decades since the publication of Langille’s Subset article, the 
economic underpinnings to which labour and employment law continue 
to be applied have altered dramatically: industrial production has been 
shifted from the “developed” to the “developing” world by enterprises 
that outsource and command global supply chains in what often emerged 
from processes of corporate “vertical and horizontal disaggregation”11; 
the significance of both service and financial sectors has increased in 
4. Stacey R Ball, Canadian Employment Law (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 2010) (loose-leaf 2016, 
release 65); Geoffrey England, Individual Employment Law, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law Inc, 2008).
5. George W Adams, Canadian Labour Law, 2nd ed (Aurora: Canada Law Book, 1993) (loose-
leaf 2016, release 58). This is different to the sort of national and sector bargaining that one finds 
in Europe: see Roy Adams, Industrial Relations under Liberal Democracy: North America in 
Comparative Perspective (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995).
6. Gillian Demeyere, “The Contract of Employment at the Supreme Court of Canada: Employee 
Protection and the Presumption of Employer Freedom” (2015) 38:1 Dal LJ 1.
7. Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender: The Multinational Corporation in Canada (Montreal: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2002) (a reprint of the 1970’s original edition).
8. Langille, “Subset,” supra note 2 at 213, citing WD Woods & Pradeep Kumar, eds, The Current 
Industrial Relations Scene in Canada (Kingston: Industrial Relations Center, 1979) at 303. 
9. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1971).
10. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
11. Hugh Collins, “Independent Contractors and the Challenge of Vertical Disintegration to 
Employment Protection Laws” (1990) 10:3 Oxford J Leg Stud 353.
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advanced economies12; and there has been a rise of part-time and casual 
employment as well as the contracting out of “services,” which has led 
to precarious employment for increasing numbers of workers.13 This 
fissuring of workplaces has been accompanied by a dramatic decrease in 
union density in the private sector,14 even while public sector union density 
has dramatically increased.15 It is not surprising that traditional normative 
justifications for labour and employment law have been criticized, from 
left, right and centre, as no longer being up to their regulatory tasks.16 It 
is in this context that this paper re-assesses whether Langille’s seemingly 
simple proposition that “labour law is a subset of employment law” is a 
helpful way to think our way through the complex issues of how to justify 
and regulate work relations and labour markets.
 This paper begins with a short commentary on Langille’s original 1981 
Subset article, to put the subsequent remarks in context. It then summarizes 
key developments in what many Canadian practitioners continue to label 
“employment law,” before engaging in a similar exercise in relation to 
“labour law.”17 The article ends with two sections on where and how 
we might go from here. The first deals with new dimensions of the key 
generic issues about how to identify appropriate definitions of employees 
and employers in the new world of precarious employment and fissured 
workplaces. The second references Langille’s more recent writings, 
which abandon Rawls and Dworkin as the primary sources for normative 
principles to explain work relations in favour of a capabilities approach to 
the development of human freedom, as evidenced by the work of Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum. These approaches, which identify human 
capability development as foundational to a proper understanding of labour 
and employment law, are ones with which I am in substantial agreement.18 
12. Doug Henwood, After the New Economy (New York: The New Press, 2003).
13. Leah F Vosko, ed, Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada 
(Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006).
14. David Weil, The Fissured Workplace: Why Work Became So Bad for So Many and What Can Be 
Done to Improve It (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2014).
15. Allen Ponak & Mark Thompson, “Public Sector Collective Bargaining” in Morley Gunderson, 
Allen Ponak & Daphne G Taras, eds, Union Management Relations in Canada (Toronto: Addison 
Wesley Longman, 2001) 414.
16. Harry W Arthurs, “What Immortal Hand or Eye?—Who Will Redraw the Boundaries of Labour 
Law?” in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, eds, Boundaries and Frontiers of Labour Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 2006) 373; see also Katherine VW Stone & Harry Arthurs, eds, Rethinking Workplace 
Regulation: Beyond the Standard Contract of Employment (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 
2013).
17. Terminology outside North America tends to use the labels “labour law” and “employment law” 
interchangeably, but they have distinctly different meanings in Canada and the US: see the companion 
pieces by Mark Freedland & Alan Bogg in this volume as well as the discussion, infra.
18. See Bruce P Archibald, “Capabilities Approaches and Labour Law through a Relational and 
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The upshot for me is that, paradoxically, the diversity in the sources of 
law governing labour market regulation both reinforce and destabilize the 
traditional and limiting bifurcation of labour law and employment law in 
Canada. The common law and employment standards legislation, which 
predominate in employment law, are simultaneously bound by restrictive 
notions of the standard contract of employment, while also containing 
elements that occasionally allow adjudicators to transcend such limitations 
and, potentially, allow human capability theory to be seen as a helpful way 
to unify a broader conceptual field. Labour law has been progressively 
cracked open, like employment law, by human rights standards; however, 
only labour law has benefitted in Canada from expanded constitutional 
protections, which may protect a relatively autonomous sphere for the 
elaboration of an understanding of how a human development approach 
can explain and justify progressive evolution of the field. Current legal 
prospects for restorative regulation of labour markets based on notions of 
equality, mutual concern, respect and flex/stability elaborated through the 
lens of a capabilities approach are thus hedged about with structural and 
normative uncertainty—particularly when democratic politics has become 
more and more dominated by illiberal populism.
I. Langille’s original vision of “labour law as a subset of employment 
law”
The jumping-off point for Langille’s initial analysis of labour law as a 
subset of employment law is part of an effort “to explicitly acknowledge 
the pre-eminence of public over private values in the industrial sector” 
so as to take a “unified view,” which will begin to “consciously integrate 
collective bargaining and other social policies instead of pretending 
they exist in separate worlds.”19 This language might lead one to think 
that Langille was proceeding from a European mindset that understands 
labour/employment law to be a subset of “social law” that can include 
social welfare provisions, employment insurance, pensions, protections 
against job redundancy, workforce training, and the like.20 But while 
Langille made references that demonstrate an awareness of this larger 
Restorative Regulatory Lens” in Brian Langille, ed, The Capability Approach to Labour Law (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019).
19. This language from Langille, “Subset,” supra note 2 at 201 is taken from a quote by Harry 
Arthurs in his “Free Collective Bargaining in a Regulated Society” in The Direction of Labour Policy 
in Canada (Montreal: Industrial Relations Centre 1977) at 112. 
20. To get a flavour for the European perspective, see Alain Supiot, Beyond Employment: Changes 
in Work and the Future of Labour Law in Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Roger 
Blanpain, European Labour Law (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2010) at 29-33; or 
Manfred Weiss, “Industrial Relations and EU Enlargement” in John DR Craig & Michael Lynk, eds, 
Globalization and the Future of Labour Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) at 169.
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context, he asserted in the end that “[e]mployment law is aimed at 
securing a minimum level of concern and respect within the employment 
relationship.”21 His focus remained on showing that employment law 
is the “proper subject for study” as opposed to simply concentrating on 
labour law, which is a subset of the former. However, Langille eschewed 
the notion that he was simply making “a cry for individual over collective 
rights” but rather was emphasizing consideration of “the proper impact of 
our publicly expressed values upon private arrangements.”22 This was an 
important observation at a time when employer counsel, and indeed many 
judges, were advancing arguments that individual employment and even 
collective labour law relationships were matters of private contract to be 
determined by the parties, and that statutory incursions on these private 
arrangements were to be interpreted restrictively.23 
The sources of what Langille viewed as “our publicly expressed 
values” are consistent with propositions from Rawls and Dworkin, at 
least in the broadest sense. Langille accepted the Rawlsian notions that 
“[m]odern democratic states are concerned to provide and protect the 
liberties of its citizens while at the same time providing a minimum set of 
social conditions.”24 Furthermore, in terms of specific normative principles, 
Langille then adopted Dworkin’s complementary goals that “society is 
concerned to see that its citizens are treated with respect, that is ‘as human 
beings who are capable of forming and acting upon intelligent conceptions 
of how their lives should be lived’” and “concern, that is ‘as human beings 
who are capable of suffering and frustration.’”25 For Langille, the purpose 
then was not to establish economic and social equality among citizens, but 
rather to avoid “gross forms of exploitation.”26 The public intervention 
through employment law is to establish a “floor of basic standards,” 
although Langille acknowledged the relativity of this exercise by a cute 
reference to the then popular Paul Simon song in the famous lyric: “one 
man’s ceiling is another man’s floor.”27 The basic floor is not merely to 
ensure economic survival, but rather to ensure that workers can express 
themselves as citizens in other activities.28 However, in the end, Langille 
21. Langille, “Subset,” supra note 2 at 230.
22. Ibid.
23. The present author recalls encountering these arguments as a young arbitrator in the 1980s with 
surprising regularity. 
24. Langille, “Subset,” supra note 2 at 201, citing Rawls.
25. Ibid at 201, citing Dworkin.
26. Ibid at 202.
27. Ibid, n 14.
28. In this, Langille picks up (ibid at 202) on the influential article by David Beatty, “Labour is not 
a Commodity” in Barry Reiter & John Swan, eds, Studies in Contract Law (Toronto: Butterworths, 
Up-dating Langille’s Insights with a Capabilities Approach 451
in 1981 adopted the orthodox protective rational for employment/labour 
law (redressing inequality of bargaining power as between employers 
and employees), while hedging it about with qualifications, such as the 
need for human rights protections against irrational considerations, eg 
discrimination on the grounds of sex or race.29 This is an important matter, 
to which we will return in the penultimate segment of this paper. 
The “Subset” article hints at, but does not make explicit, any reference 
to Langille’s later mantra that there are two basic public policy options 
to counter inequality of bargaining power between employees and 
employers: one is to allow for unionization, which enables workers to 
“turn up the dial” on their bargaining power and achieve better conditions 
of employment through collective action—a procedural mechanism; the 
other is to change the content of the terms and conditions of employment 
contracts through statutory standards—a substantive mechanism.30 The 
1981 article describes unionized workers as the “haves” who, with the 
assistance of their union, can negotiate terms of employment that rise above 
the statutory labour standards employment floor, while non-unionized 
workers are “have-nots” who may be forced to put up with those minimum 
standards. But Langille’s premise was that the statutory minima constitute 
an advance over “the archaic common law under the odious rubric ‘the law 
of master and servant,’ which consists of the assorted relics of a dead social 
order.”31 Subject to what will be said below about subsequent evolution in 
Canadian common law, Langille was surely right. He described the “new 
content of employment law” which, in statutory reforms to the common 
law by 1981, contained not only the long-standing minimum terms on 
such issues as wages, vacation entitlements, limits on employment of 
children, minimum notice on termination and provisions regulating group 
terminations, but also, in three jurisdictions (Nova Scotia, Quebec and the 
federal level), a right against unjust dismissal (upon achieving a certain 
length of employment tenure) with reinstatement as a remedy. This latter 
phenomenon was a radical departure from the common law. Langille 
describes how the just cause provisions in these three jurisdictions led 
to the adoption, from arbitration in the unionized sector, of the notion of 
“progressive discipline,” which was unknown at common law. The “new 
content” of employment law also included two other areas of radical 
statutory innovation: occupational health and safety legislation and human 
1980). This is an important link to Langille’s current thinking too, as will be pointed out below.
29. Langille, “Subset,” supra note 2 at 204.
30. Brian Langille, “Labour Law’s Back Pages” in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, Boundaries and 
Frontiers of Labour Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) 13.
31. Langille, “Subset,” supra note 2 at 200.
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rights acts, the latter applicable well beyond the realm of employment law. 
These areas not only established standards, but also involved proactive 
investigative agencies with separate enforcement tribunals as hallmarks 
of the interventionist welfare state. Of course, these new supplementary 
branches of “employment law” applied to the unionized sector as well, 
forming an important justification for Langille’s claim that labour law 
had become a subset of employment law. Moreover, the reach of human 
rights processes moved early on into equality claims, which had pension 
and benefit implications and sometimes involved controversial affirmative 
action initiatives. The blending of employment law with labour law was 
proceeding at a steady pace by the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s.
In turning his attention to how parties governed by collective 
bargaining related to employment standards regimes, Langille’s Subset 
article addressed both substantive and procedural concerns. A key 
focus of the substantive analysis was the question of whether parties to 
collective bargaining could adopt collective agreement provisions that 
derogated from employment standards minima. Langille’s conclusion 
concerning this, then highly contested, area was that, despite comments 
in the 1968 Woods Task Force report to the contrary, such an approach 
was not appropriate: “if, as argued, employment standards are aimed at 
securing a bare minimum of concern for employees in order to secure 
important social policies reflecting basic value judgments, then there is 
little force in the argument that employees should be able to choose to 
freely bind themselves contractually to work below that floor.”32 But, in 
a pragmatic though principled analysis, Langille admitted that parties to 
collective bargaining could, like others, apply to labour standards officials 
for exemptions that would allow them to obtain relief from general 
employment standards, which caused difficulty for publicly justifiable 
bargained outcomes.33 Langille’s arguments about the procedural impact 
of employment standards legislation on the collective bargaining sector 
are directed to issues concerning the jurisdiction of labour arbitrators 
deciding disputes under collective agreements and concerning a union’s 
duty of fair representation. On the first issue, Langille, writing only five 
or six years after the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in McLeod v 
Egan,34 supported an expansive interpretation of that case, advocating that 
arbitrators should be held to have jurisdiction, in interpreting and applying 
collective agreements, to apply statutes governing work relationships (as 
32. Ibid at 216.
33. Ibid at 217.
34. [1975] 1 SCR 517, 46 DLR (3d) 150.
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was then statutorily authorized in Nova Scotia and British Columbia) 
regardless of the private intentions of the parties.35 This vindicates the 
“general law of employment” representing public values of concern 
and respect for employees as applicable to unionized labour relations. 
Similarly, Langille waded into the treacherous stream of the union’s duty, 
as the holder of employee access to arbitration, to represent all members 
of the bargaining unit fairly. Langille’s controversial position was that 
unions have a duty to take an employee’s grievance to arbitration where it 
involves a breach of a statutory employment standard, and that such claims 
of a publicly valued nature cannot be traded off against other individual 
or collective interests by the union. Thus, in both these procedural 
contexts, Langille argued that labour law institutions are subordinated 
to the publicly and democratically (that is, legislatively) endorsed values 
of concern and respect for individual employee rights as instantiated in 
statutory employment law. 
II. Four decades of mixed evolution in Canadian labour and 
employment law
It might be said that in the almost four decades since “Subset” was 
published, little has changed in terms of the structural relationship between 
labour law and statutory employment law, and that the subset notion still 
has formal validity. But there have been developments in relation to both 
that are important to consider for a reassessment of the original Langille 
thesis. A brief overview of the evolution in Canadian employment law in 
its common law and statutory variants is in order, before engaging in the 
same exercise in relation to labour law and collective bargaining. Only then 
can one turn to an analysis of why this relative stasis in the relationship 
between labour and employment law has contributed to the seismic shift in 
the underlying economic and social conditions that have largely rendered 
traditional labour and employment law to be impediments, rather than 
supports, in the attainment of social and economic justice for the vast 
majority of Canada’s working people.
Starting with the common law of employment, one must acknowledge 
that, in the post-World War II decades, the predominance of the standard 
contract of employment, as the platform for the social and economic 
benefits provided by the welfare state, led Canadian judges to preside 
over mutations in the common law, which have distanced the common 
law of employment significantly from the “chaos” of its roots in English 
35. Langille, “Subset,” supra note 2 at 224.
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master and servant law.36 Of course, the common law gave precedence to 
freedom of action for employers and, as noted above, knew no doctrine 
of unjust cause for dismissal for employees: employees only had a right 
to a reasonable period of notice for dismissal.37 The principle was that 
employment was at the will of the employer alone. Canadian employees 
began to challenge the harshness of this approach in the 1970s, seeking 
job security on the assumption that indefinite employment was assumed 
to be “career long.”38 While a confused case law emerged from the lower 
courts, it was not until 1992 that the Supreme Court of Canada accepted 
that, because of inequality of bargaining power between employer and 
employee, contracts of employment should not be interpreted on the 
principle, widely applicable to commercial contracts, that parties should 
be assumed to be equals.39 In the meantime, there was conflicting litigation 
over whether damages for mental distress or aggravated damages for the 
manner of dismissal (either with notice or for cause) could be awarded, a 
conflict that was not resolved until 2008.40 The conclusion was that mental 
distress damages for an improper manner of dismissal should flow from 
proof of actual loss suffered,41 rather than through a process of deeming the 
reasonable notice period to be extended for such a purpose.42 The formal 
principle was thus maintained that the common law would not regulate the 
fairness of employee treatment during the term of the contract, but only 
the manner of dismissal. Nonetheless, in cases of constructive dismissal 
(where an employee may be found justified in terminating employment 
where employer conduct fundamentally breached explicit or implied terms 
in the contract of employment), some cases decided that such a breach 
might be found where an employer treated an employee without “civility, 
36. There are Canadian parallels with the analysis of Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, The Law of 
the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment and Legal Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2005), which suggests that the law of master and servant in the UK was transcended by the 
standard contract of employment because the latter was thought to be a functional necessity for the 
delivery of employment-related welfare state benefits, such as employment insurance and pensions. 
See also Brian Langille, “Labour Policy in Canada: New Platform, New Paradigm”  (2002) 28:1 Can 
Pub Pol’y 1 [“Labour Policy”].
37. The locus classicus for this position was Addis v Gramophone Co Ltd, [1909] AC 488, [1909] 
UKHL 1. However, the consolidation in Canada of its notion that contracts of employment are to be 
based on principles of commercial contract law did not occur until Addis was firmly adopted in Peso 
Silver Mines v Cropper, [1966] SCR 673, 58 DLR (2d) 1.   
38. See Claire Mummé, “A Comparative Reflection from Canada—A Good Faith Perspective” in 
Mark Freedland et al, eds, The Contract of Employment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) for 
an excellent summary of this area. 
39. Machtinger v HOJ Industries Ltd, [1992] 1 SCR 986, 91 DLR (4th) 491.
40. For a discussion of these issues, see Mummé, supra, note 38.
41. Keays v Honda Canada Ltd, 2008 SCC 39.
42. This had been the decision in Wallace v United Grain Growers, [1997] 3 SCR 701, 152 DLR 
(4th) 1.
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decency, respect and dignity.”43 For some time, it had been thought 
that tort law could fill the contract law void where there was separately 
actionable evidence of intentional or negligent infliction of mental stress 
on an employee by an employer.44 However, that reasoning came under 
fire when it was held that the recognition of tort remedies for the infliction 
of mental distress in the employment context was inappropriate, and that 
these issues should only find remedy in relation to manner of dismissal 
(constructive or otherwise) under the employment contract.45 Most 
recently, though, the Supreme Court of Canada has finally demonstrated an 
apparent commitment to regulate the fairness of employer conduct during 
the term of an employment contract—a potential conceptual revolution.46 
In a dispute over the non-renewal of a commercial agency arrangement, 
somewhat akin to an employment situation, the Court in Bhansin v Hrynew 
recognized “good faith” as an “organizing principle” in the law of contract, 
and that there had been a breach of a consequent “duty to honestly perform 
a contractual obligation.”47 Several months later, the Court applied this 
doctrine in a case called Potter, who was a relatively high-ranking public 
servant, and whose employing authority failed to inform Potter of the 
reason for his suspension from employment. The Court held, following 
Bhasin, that “acting in good faith in relation to contractual dealings means 
being honest, reasonable, candid and forthright” and that failing to give 
an employee reasons for his suspension was not being forthright.48 The 
upshot of these recent cases for the common law of employment can 
be characterized by what Langille might have said in 1981 to be the 
recognition of public values of concern and respect for employees that 
go beyond the limitations of the common law of master and servant and 
their “archaic values imbedded in a dead social order.” The problem in 
invoking these enlightened values of the new common law of employment 
is that it can only be done through expensive civil litigation. This is truly 
employment law for the “haves,” that is, senior employees, managers and 
43. Lloyd v Imperial Parking Ltd, [1997] 3 WWR 697, 192 AR 190 (Alta QB); see also Shah v Xerox 
Canada Ltd, (2000) 131 OAC 44, [2000] OJ No 849 (Ont CA). 
44. Vorvis v Insurance Corporation of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 1085, [1989] 4 WWR 218 
(dicta on intentional); Sulz v Canada (AG), 2006 BCCA 582 (recovery re negligence).
45. Piresferreira v Ayotte, 2010 ONCA 384, leave to appeal to SCC refused. This reasoning was 
adopted in Sanford v Carleton Road Industries Association, 2014 NSSC 187.
46. Compare the following analysis with the comments on the vicissitudes of the English doctrine 
of the “continuing obligation of mutual trust and confidence between employer and employee” as 
discussed Mark Freedland’s companion piece in this volume in the text at footnotes 17 to 20.  
47. Bhasin v Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71.
48. Potter v New Brunswick (Legal Aid Services Commission), 2015 SCC 10 at para 99.
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professionals, and, as such, the common law of employment is beyond the 
practical reach of the “regular working stiff.”
Shifting focus to Canadian statutory labour standards, acts or codes, 
one can only conclude that the picture has been less than rosy over the 
past four decades in terms of their concern and respect for workers. 
Minimum wage inadequacy has been a flashpoint across the country, with 
a patchwork of different standards in the various jurisdictions. Certainly, 
none has established what one might consider a “living wage” as a 
minimum, and virtually none has kept up with rates of inflation in the 
economy.49 Enforcement has been problematic, in the sense that there has 
been a general abandonment of pro-active inspections by labour standards 
officials in favour of complaint-driven models. It appears that most workers 
are unwilling to make complaints for fear of being fired or otherwise 
prejudiced, so that complaints are predominantly claims for unpaid back 
wages or pay in lieu of vacation entitlements by claimants who do not wish to 
contest their dismissal. In any event, the original three jurisdictions having 
a remedy of reinstatement for unjust dismissals (Quebec, Nova Scotia and 
the federal jurisdiction) are still the only ones in which such orders can be 
made. Levels of financial recovery for non-statutory compliant dismissal 
are not as generous or flexible as the common law potential in cases of 
failure to give reasonable notice or constructive dismissal; however, the 
wage worker who relies on the statutory labour standards system at least 
has the benefit of enforcement through an administrative tribunal operating 
on a gratis basis, and thereby avoids the financial risks of common law 
litigation. There have been occasional government-sponsored independent 
reviews of labour standards, and the implementation by governments in 
receipt of the recommendations of such reviews has been uneven.50 The 
most recent recommendations to a provincial government were partially 
implemented by a relatively “progressive” legislature, but were repealed in 
short order by an illiberal, populist government which stepped into office 
shortly thereafter.51 Other elements of the statutory employment-linked 
49. See Nicole M Fortin & Thomas Lemieux, “Changes in Wage Inequality in Canada: An 
Interprovincial Perspective” in David A Green, W Craig Riddell & France St-Hilaire, eds, Income 
Inequality: The Canadian Story (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 2016).
50. See Harry Arthurs, Fairness at Work: Labour Standard for the 21st Century (Ottawa: Federal 
Labour Standards Review, 2006)  [Arthurs Report], conducted in the last days of a Liberal federal 
government for recommendations which were then ignored by the subsequent Conservative 
government, but have gained a more sympathetic legislative implementation under Justin Trudeau’s 
Liberal tenure.
51. Thus, in Ontario, a Liberal Government commissioned Michael Mitchell and John Murray to 
conduct the “Changing Workplaces Review,” which received substantial implementation immediately 
after their Report submitted in May of 2017 but became the subject of repeal in 2018 after the arrival 
of the “Progressive” Conservative government of Doug Ford.
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social safety net still exist much as they did when Langille was writing 
in 1981: workers’ compensation for those who suffer on the job injury 
continues to evolve in a system involving federal/provincial cooperation 
from a bygone era52; the Canada Pension Plan still exists, though it is 
criticized for not being sufficiently generous and recommendations for 
provincial proposals to enhance pension coverage have fallen on deaf 
ears53; the federal system of employment insurance has been tinkered with 
by various governments, but is still there to give some support workers 
who lose their jobs and maternity leave for women; and a new federal 
child support program supplements various provincial day-care schemes 
to assist parents who remain in the workforce.54 The continuation of these 
uneven supplementary programs, of course, applies to both unionized and 
non-unionized sectors, and sustains the original Langille view that labour 
is a sub-set of employment law, but nonetheless substantive statutory 
employment law has remained surprisingly static over the intervening 
decades.
While the collective bargaining regime of Canadian labour law can still 
be seen as nestled in the broader environment of statutory employment law 
as described above, from both statutory and constitutional perspectives, 
labour law has in the past four decades gained a certain weight and legal 
autonomy that sets it apart as an element of employment law writ large.55 
This process began before Langille wrote the “Subset” article in 1981. 
In 1976, the Supreme Court of Canada, speaking through Chief Justice 
Bora Laskin, a former labour arbitrator, held that while the notion of an 
employment contract in the narrow sense applies at the moment of hiring 
when employee and employer agree that the former will work for the 
52. Constitutional competency over workers’ compensation is discussed in a trilogy of cases decided 
by the Supreme Court of Canada: Canadian National Railway Co v Courtois, [1988] 1 SCR 868, 
51 DLR (4th) 271; Bell Canada c Québec (Commission de la santé et de la sécurité du travail du 
Québec), [1988] 1 SCR 749, 51 DLR (4th) 161; Alltrans Express Ltd v British Columbia (Workers’/
Workmen’s Compensation Board), [1988] 1 SCR 897, 51 DLR (4th) 253. Federal employees may 
seek recourse under provincial workers’ compensation schemes; however, any provision within 
a provincial compensation statute that regulates occupational health and safety will be limited to 
provincial undertakings.
53. Canada Pension Plan Act, RSC 1985, c C-8; for various unimplemented reform proposals, 
see: Expert Commission on Pensions, A Fine Balance: Safe Pensions, Affordable Rules, Fair Rules 
(Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2008); Pension Review Panel, Promises to Keep (Government of Nova 
Scotia, 2009); and Elizabeth Shilton, “Employee Pension Rights and the False Promise of Trust Law” 
(2011) 34:1 Dal LJ 81.
54. The Justin Trudeau government, in its first mandate, made many adjustments to the Canada 
Labour Code in this regard. See, eg, Budget Implementation Act, 2018 No. 2, SC 2017, c 33, s 206.6.
55. Bruce Archibald, “The Significance of the Systemic Relative Autonomy of Labour Law” (2017) 
40:1 Dal LJ 1 [“Relative Autonomy”].
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latter, thereafter, the substantive content of the employment contract is 
ruled, virtually entirely, by the collective agreement: 
“The common law, as it applies to individual employment contracts 
is no longer relevant to employer-employee relations governed by 
a collective agreement which…deals with discharge, termination 
of employment, severance pay and a host of other matters that 
have been negotiated between union and company as the principle 
parties thereto.”56 
Indeed, unionized employers are prohibited by statute from 
negotiating with individual employees as opposed to with their union.57 
As discussed above, arbitral jurisdiction under collective agreements, 
relatively independent from the courts, began to take on significant 
dimensions. Langille in “Subset” had pointed to the ability of labour 
arbitrators to apply employment-related statutes to collective agreements 
as an indicator of labour law’s subordination to the general law of 
employment58; however, in the last decade of the 20th Century and the 
first decade of the 21st, arbitrators gained exclusive jurisdiction to rule 
on any “dispute or difference…[which in its essential character] arises 
from the interpretation, application, administration or violation of the 
collective agreement.”59 This dictum was taken to authorize arbitrators to 
apply the Charter of Rights and Freedoms,60 when dealing with a public 
sector employer, or aspects of common law at large if they relate to the 
essential character of the dispute.61 Moreover, this arbitral jurisdiction was 
held to oust the jurisdiction of common law courts, to say nothing of other 
administrative tribunals, in relation to such things as workplace torts.62 
56. McGavin Toastmaster Ltd v Ainscough, [1976] 1 SCR 718, 54 DLR (3d) 1 at para 10. The 
collective agreement is thus a statutorily authorized contract for the benefit of a third party, a notion 
unknown at common law, and is not subject to the common law of contract doctrine of repudiation 
merely because of employees going on an illegal strike.
57. Compare this with the situation in the UK as discussed by Mark Freedland in his companion 
piece in this volume.
58. This was reinforced with respect to the application of human rights statutes to the interpretation 
of collective agreements in Parry Sound (District) Social Services Administration Board v Ontario 
Public Service Employees Union, Local 324, 2003 SCC 42.
59. Weber v Ontario Hydro, [1995] 2 SCR 929, 125 DLR (4th) 583 at paras 56-57 [Weber].
60. Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
61. Weber, supra note 59.
62. Ibid. This development has been the subject of criticism by some who have suggested it is over-
loading labour arbitration with issues that ought to be before the courts (see e.g. the work of Michel 
Picher) and others who argue that it inappropriately prevents access to justice in the general courts 
where an arbitrator may incorrectly deny or refuse to hear the case: See Brian Etherington, “OPSEU 
v Seneca College: Deference as a Two-Edged Sword—A Missed Opportunity to Address the ‘Weber 
Gap’” (2006-2007) 13 CLELJ 301.
Up-dating Langille’s Insights with a Capabilities Approach 459
Labour arbitrators, with this ample jurisdiction, have also been held to 
be the subject of broad judicial deference within their bailiwick, which 
tends to stave off successful judicial review.63 In this context it is important 
to realize that the courts in this period were upholding arbitral decisions 
that determined that management rights reserved by standard recognition 
clauses in collective agreements must be exercised “reasonably,”64 and that 
arbitrators were entitled to fashion equitable remedies befitting their role in 
providing pragmatic responses to breaches of collective agreements.65 But 
arguably, the most dramatic way in which labour law is “legally different” 
from the rest of employment law is the extent to which it is protected by 
the Charter. In 2007, the Supreme Court of Canada reversed a line of case 
law dating back to the early days of the Charter,66 and held that collective 
bargaining is a constitutionally protected form of freedom of association 
under section 2(d).67 This was reinforced in a 2015 case, which determined 
that the right to strike is constitutionally protected as a necessary corollary 
of collective bargaining.68 In that same year another case held that unions, 
to fill their constitutional role, must be independent of management and 
democratic in their structure and operation, so as to be able to bargain 
effectively for their members.69 However, this line of constitutional cases 
also serves to reinforce the conceptual demarcation between labour 
and employment law highlighted by Langille in 1981: labour law is a 
constitutionally protected procedural mechanism only, while common 
law and statutory employment law and, even formally “free” collective 
bargaining, regulate the substantive content of employment relations in 
ways that are not constitutionally protected. This analysis flows from 
the third labour law case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
2015, where it was decided that collective bargaining did not mandate 
any substantive outcome, as long as the procedural aspects of the process 
were met, and therefore a collectively bargained wage deal for RCMP 
officers was not to be protected from general wage controls legislated by 
63. Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9.
64. Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union, Local 30 v Irving Pulp & Paper Ltd, 2013 
SCC 34. 
65. Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals, 
2011 SCC 59.
66. Reference re Public Service Employee Relations Act (Alberta), [1987] 1 SCR 313, 38 DLR (4th) 
161; PSAC v Canada, [1987] 1 SCR 424, 38 DLR (4th) 249; and RWDSU v Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 
SCR 460, 38 DLR (4th) 277; and Professional Institute of the Public Service of Canada v Northwest 
Territories (Commissioner), [1990] 2 SCR 367, 72 DLR (4th) 1.
67. Health Services and Support—Facilities Subsector Bargaining Assn v British Columbia, 2007 
SCC 27.
68. Saskatchewan Federation of Labour v Saskatchewan, 2015 SCC 4.
69. Mounted Police Association of Ontario v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 1.  
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Parliament in relation to all civil servants.70 It is hard to avoid the conclusion 
that employment standards will therefore not likely receive constitutional 
protection, particularly in a context where the Supreme Court of Canada 
has interpreted Charter section 15 as being an anti-discrimination clause, 
containing equality guarantees, rather than one oriented broadly to the 
promotion of social and economic equality.71
This analysis suggests that labour law can still be thought of as a subset 
of employment law, even if a constitutionally super-charged one, and that 
to determine the extent to which employment/labour law is fulfilling its 
role of adequately responding to the social and economic needs for concern 
and respect for workers in a constitutional democracy, one must look to 
other dimensions of the matter. Clearly, collective bargaining has failed 
in its purported purpose of lifting large numbers of workers in the private 
sector of the economy above minimum labour standards, as apparently 
assumed by Langille in 1981. In the intervening decades, union density 
in the private sector has fallen from 30 per cent to something below 16 
per cent, even if it is still above 70 per cent in the public sector.72 This 
leaves huge numbers of private sector workers dependent on the common 
law of employment and statutory employment standards for protection 
from exploitation by employers and subject to the difficulties in deploying 
both (as explored above). Thus, it appears that neither employment law 
in the broadest sense, nor collective labour law in the narrower sense, 
are attaining their potential, unified though they may still be, under the 
joined rubric of a broad, publicly regulated “employment law” in the 
original Langille “Subset” vision. One important reason for the failure 
of employment and labour law is that both were premised upon notions 
of the likelihood of career-long, full-time employment with a single, 
large employer whose economic clout could be relied upon to provide 
stable income and benefits leading to a reasonable pension in retirement. 
This stereotype of the “standard contract of employment” is no longer a 
plausible basis for responding to workers’ expectations of concern and 
respect from both employers and society at large.73 But deconstructing 
the “standard contract of employment” and reconstructing a basis for its 
70. Meredith v Canada (AG), 2015 SCC 2.
71. See Brian Langille, “Why the Right-Freedom Distinction Matters to Labour Lawyers—And to 
All Canadians” (2011) 34:1 Dal LJ 143.
72. See Statistics Canada, Long Term Trends in Canadian Unionization by Diane Galarneau & Thao 
Sohn (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2013).
73. See Mark Freedland & Nicola Kountouris, The Legal Construction of Personal Work Relations, 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) [Personal Work Relations]; Richard Johnstone et al, Beyond 
Employment: The Legal Regulation of Work Relationships (Sydney: Federation Press, 2012) [Beyond 
Employment]; and  Stone & Arthurs, supra note 16. 
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replacement requires a revisioning of the regulation of personal work 
relations beyond the formal legal notion of “employment.” Moreover, 
unearthing an adequate normative framework on which to base such an 
exercise means pushing beyond the public commitment to civic “concern 
and respect,” as understood by Rawls and Dworkin. As will be described 
in the final portion of this commentary, Brian Langille is once again at the 
forefront of the effort to re-align theory and practice in ways that may help 
revive progressive public policy in this regard.74 But, before getting to 
that, some exegesis is in order concerning the halting steps on the practical 
front in Canada to move in such a direction.  
III. Going beyond standard employment and toward a capabilities/
human freedom approach to the normative foundations for regulating 
personal work relations
As stressed above, in Canada as in other post-World War II welfare 
states, many socio-economic benefits were erected on the platform of the 
standard, full-time (or at least regular part-time) contract of employment.75 
This was true in the area of employment law where statutory benefits and 
entitlements were largely unavailable to temporary or casual employees,76 
and also in labour law, where temporary or casual employees were 
commonly excluded from bargaining units composed of full-time or 
regular part-time employees on the theory that casuals did not share a 
“community of interest” with long-term employees. These legal structures 
gave a huge incentive to employers to find both legitimate and disingenuous 
ways to avoid engaging workers in accordance with standard employment 
contracts.77 An analysis of these forms of slippage in, or undermining of, 
worker protections in many jurisdictions is often conducted by examining 
two rather fundamental and usually interdependent  questions: (a) who is 
an “employee” for the purposes of labour and employment law coverage? 
and (b) who, or indeed what, is an “employer” for these same purposes? 
The answers to these questions have never been simple, and they involve 
policy issues that can best be resolved by reference to the normative 
principles that should underpin the legal dimensions of labour market 
74. Brian Langille, “Labour Law’s Theory of Justice” in Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, eds, The 
Idea of Labour Law (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011) at 101 [Idea of Labour Law].
75. Langille, “Labour Policy,” supra note 36.
76. Minimum wage provisions, however, are normally applicable across the board to all employees.
77. Brian Langille, “‘Take these Chains from my Heart and Set me Free’: How Labour Law Theory 
Drives Segmentation of Workers’ Rights” (2015) 36:2 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 257; and Simon Deakin, 
“Addressing Labour Market Segmentation: The Role of Labour Law” (2013) International Labour 
Organization Working Paper No 52.
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regulation in current global circumstances.78 Exploring these matters 
will enable an analysis of why the notion of labour law being a subset 
of employment law, rooted in values of abstract concern and respect for 
workers, is no longer an adequate understanding of the justifying norms 
in the field of sophisticated labour market regulation. Even if Langille’s 
original 1981 observations were certainly not “wrong,” they can now be 
transcended, comprehended and re-thought through a capabilities and 
human development approach.79
Looking first to the definition of who is an employee for the purposes 
of labour and employment law, a fundamental distinction, going back to the 
traditional common law of master and servant, has long been made between 
hiring a worker under a “contract of service” (i.e. employment) as opposed 
to hiring under a “contract for services” (ie a commercial arrangement 
with an “independent contractor”).80 The continuing legitimacy of this 
legal distinction is generally not disputed; however, its abuse by certain 
employers in the interests of avoiding statutory labour and employment 
obligations has been a matter of concern since the inception of the post-
World War II regulatory regimes. Successorship provisions in the original 
labour and employment statutes allowed tribunals to declare contracting 
out of business functions to be illegal where the purpose was to avoid 
obligations to employees or unions, but such manoeuvres were deemed 
to be acceptable if there was a “legitimate business reason” to engage in 
the practice—that is to say, the sub-contractor could do the work more 
cheaply than an employee entitled to benefits. This Trojan horse regularly 
became used to trample upon what workers perceived to be their statutory 
or collectively bargained protective rights. Legislatures responded in some 
jurisdictions by allowing for the unionization of “dependent contractors” 
where the legal form of the hiring clearly resembled a continuing work 
relationship of subordination and control associated with “employment,” 
while similar outcomes were achieved in other jurisdictions by giving 
purposive interpretations to opaque definitions of the word “employee” 
in the governing legislation.81 This contractor versus employee distinction 
is most difficult to draw when the work is of a temporary nature, since it 
78. Some would argue, and perhaps Langille would now agree, that these traditional questions are 
too limiting a way to conceptualize the problems: see Noah D Zatz, “Does Work Law Have a Future 
If the Labor Market Does Not?” (2016) 91:3 Chicago-Kent L Rev 1081. 
79. See the discussion in the next section of this paper.
80. Brian A Langille & Guy Davidov, “Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View 
from Canada” (1999) 21:1 Comp Lab L & Pol’y J 7.
81. Judy Fudge, Eric Tucker & Leah Vosko, “Employee or Independent Contractor? Charting the 
Legal Significance of the Distinction in Canada” (2003) 10 CLELJ 193.
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is easier to find the hiring arrangement to involve an “employee” rather 
than a “contractor” where the engagement is of a continuing nature.82 The 
other major problem concerning the classification of an employee for the 
purposes of protective legislation is the segmentation of the workforce 
by use of casual employees, or what European observers refer to as “zero 
hours” contract workers, who are called in on an “as needed” basis.83 To 
the extent that splitting up work among casuals is intended to avoid the 
duty to provide statutory entitlements that accrue to full-time employees, 
the problem can be legislatively addressed by requiring entitlements to 
be awarded to all workers and pro-rating the benefits in accordance with 
hours worked. Such a process is normal for overtime earned by full-time 
employees. However, this solution causes administrative and financial 
burdens for employers and has been successfully opposed by employers in 
Canadian political arenas. Of course, to the extent that “casuals” are being 
called in for full or regular hours, but being refused entitlements, tribunals 
can deem the workers to be regular part-time or even full-time workers.84 
However, individuals who make such a procedural fuss are likely to be 
fired, unless they have a union to represent them. It is interesting to note, 
however, that unions, which once might have accepted the policy that 
casuals are out of bargaining units because of a lack of community of 
interest with regular employees, are now seeking to have labour boards 
include casuals in bargaining units as a matter of solidarity as well as in 
a self-preserving response to falling union density.85 In the final analysis, 
though, resolution of these problems of defining who is “an employee” for 
the purposes of entitlement to employment standards benefits or collective 
bargaining rights is embedded in the normative justifications for such 
labour market regulation—a complex of issues to be addressed shortly.
82. See, however, where the Nova Scotia Labour Board was willing to find that film technicians who 
worked for only one day, and had been labelled independent contractors by the employer, were found 
to be employees for purposes of union certification under the Trade Union Act: IATSE, Local 849 v 
Egg Films, 2012 NSLB 120 [“Egg Films”], aff’d 2014 NSCA 33, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 2014 
SCCA No 242; the present author must disclose that he was the Vice-Chair of the NSLB panel which 
issued this decision.  
83. Geoffrey England, Part-time, Casual and Other Atypical Workers: A Legal View, Research 
and Current Issues Series No 48 (Kingston: Industrial Relations Centre Press, 1987); Harry Arthurs, 
Fairness at Work: Labour Standard for the 21st Century (Ottawa: federal Labour Standards Review, 
2006) at 109-110.
84. In the unionized context, this can be done by labour relations tribunals in setting or amending the 
configuration of bargaining units: see NSGEU v Metro Community Living Support Services Ltd, 2017 
NSCA 15.
85. The Canadian Union of Public Employees has been particularly attuned to this: see NSLRB 
examples cited in Egg Films, supra note 82. 
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 Before turning to that latter question, it is essential to provide a 
glimpse of the increasingly contested question: “who, or perhaps more 
appropriately ‘what,’ is an employer for the purposes of labour and 
employment legislation?” The statutory definitions of employer are 
notoriously circular: “‘employer’ means anyone who employs more than 
one employee.”86 The use of the word “anyone” or “a person” to reference 
the employer may early on have encouraged tribunals and judges to 
interpret it with a natural person,  or the “master” of a “servant,” in mind, 
thus encouraging the importation of common law precedent rather than 
adopting a more purposive or expansive notion when interpreting the 
definition of employer. This may also have reinforced the tendency to 
conceptualize the notion of employer in personal, individual terms, and see 
corporate employers in a unitary or monolithic manner, shielded by a rigid 
understanding of impenetrable corporate legal personality.87 The drafters 
of Canadian labour and employment law legislation in the post-World 
War II era were alert to the possibility that managers might play corporate 
shell games to avoid labour and employment obligations to employees, 
and drafted common or joint employer provisions to address this problem. 
These provisions typically allowed tribunals to find the existence of only one 
employer where “associated or related activities or businesses are carried 
on by or through more than one corporation, firm, syndicate or association 
… under common management or direction, including direction of the 
workforce”88 and thereby thwart efforts to avoid the application of labour 
standards or claims that the “real employer” is not unionized.89 However, 
these provisions had their scope restricted by a narrow interpretation 
of “common management or direction, including direction of the 
workforce,”90 which, when combined with contracting out for legitimate 
business reasons as described above, gave employers a relatively free 
hand in decentralizing their operations and avoiding both application of 
employment standards,91 and unionization.92 This has ultimately led to the 
“fissuring” of workplaces in a global environment where, for example, 
86. See Trade Union Act, RSNS 1989, c 475, as amended, s 2(1)(l) is typical [Trade Union Act].
87. On these tendencies, see Jeremias Prassl, The Concept of the Employer (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2015).
88. Trade Union Act, supra note 86, s 21 is typical.
89. Canadian common law courts also developed such doctrines to counter employer efforts to 
undermine obligations on management to provide reasonable notice or compensation in lieu: see 
Downtown Eatery, infra note 112.
90. See White Spot Ltd v British Columbia (Labour Relations Board), 171 DLR (4th) 131, [1999] 
BCJ No 295, for a successful purposive application; See Centennial Villa Inc v CUPE, Local 3215, 
(1991) Order 3739 [NSLRB] [“Centennial Villa”], for a narrow interpretation.
91. Lian v J Crew Group Inc et al, 54 OR (3d) 239, [2001] OJ No 1708 [J Crew].
92. Centennial Villa, supra note 90.
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international brands for footwear or clothing manage planning, marketing 
and control of their production standards, while subcontracting or 
outsourcing actual manufacturing of products to suppliers’ jurisdictions 
with low wages and poor labour standards.93 Fissuring also occurs within 
high-wage jurisdictions through franchising and contracting out, such that 
one has the spectre of hotel brands or restaurant chains that “own” no 
commercial retail premises, and where virtually all internal functions can 
be contracted out so as to destroy any integrated labour market within the 
business (the core of industrial unionism)—a process that externalizes what 
becomes a competitive market for separate services.94 In these scenarios, 
current technology allows the lead firm or brand holder to control virtually 
all aspects of franchisee activities, and those of their subcontractors, while 
disclaiming any ability to police the labour standards adopted by the 
subordinate entities.95 Economic enterprises have, thus, over the past few 
decades, and often in the name of concentrating on “core competencies” 
and “shareholder value,” tried systematically to structure themselves in 
ways that have made identification of the “real” or “controlling” employer 
difficult. This result provides incentives to immediate or subordinate 
employers to avoid any obligations under labour standards legislation and 
to render more difficult any worker efforts at unionization. 
The scholarly ferment over the past two decades in response to the 
failure of labour and employment law to fulfill the needs of working 
people for decent working conditions, human rights at work and the 
concern and respect due to them in the labour market, has given rise to 
various sensible academic proposals for legal regulatory reform. This 
is true in relation to the inter-related, and re-framed questions: “which 
workers should be entitled to procedural and substantive protection in 
labour markets?” and “which hiring persons or controlling entities should 
be held publicly responsible for ensuring that labour market regulatory 
standards for workers are being respected?” While it is not possible 
in this brief commentary to explore the full academic literature that 
responds to these questions, it is feasible to point out a number of the 
most promising avenues for reform to then consider the most fruitful way 
to assess the best normative framework within which to evaluate some 
of the options. In answer to the question of which workers ought to be 
entitled to procedural and substantive mechanisms in labour markets, the 
93. Richard M Locke, The Promise and the Limits of Private Power (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013).
94. Weil,  supra note 14.
95. Ibid at 87-91.
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Freedland and Kountouris definition of the “personal work relation” holds 
out the most comprehensive and flexible potential.96 They suggest that 
“the personal work relation consists of an engagement or arrangement or 
set of arrangements for the carrying out of work or the rendering of service 
or services by the worker personally.”97 The purpose of this boundary 
concept is to “break the bounds of the contract of employment—both as 
to the element of ‘contract’ and as to that of ‘employment’—and to extend 
into a wider realm of ‘relation’ or ‘nexus’ …of ‘personal work’ rather than 
‘employment.’”98 Freedland and Kountouris suggest that this definition 
could be used to set the boundaries for all or merely some labour laws or 
labour rights, or be used as criteria for the evaluation of such laws or rights, 
or alternatively become the basis for presumptions about the scope of the 
application of particular labour laws or labour rights. In practical terms, 
they see multiple interfaces or contested areas for the application of such 
approaches, which might include assessment of labour and employment 
rights in relation to: self-employed persons, freelancers or contractors; 
holders of public offices; ministers of religion; charity volunteers; liberal 
professionals; managers of enterprises; employment agency managers; 
occasional, causal or temporary workers; informal or undocumented 
workers; trainees,  apprentices or work interns; those in work facilitation 
schemes; and those working for a household or caring for dependents.99 
To this list could be added certain franchisees or those working under the 
terms of a bailment.100 Freedland and Kountouris support their personal 
work relation concept and its potential range of applications by reference 
to practices in a wide range of European jurisdictions, including the UK, 
which instantiate one or more of the applications that they see within the 
scope of the personal work relation.101 In terms of the normative foundations 
for judgment calls in the invocation of such an approach, Freedland and 
Kountouris reference power imbalances in such personal work relations,102 
but argue that protective concerns can be transformed through adopting 
positive concerns or respect for dignity, capability and stability in personal 
work relations, a more stable foundation for progress.103 The issue of what 
normative standards ought to be invoked to justify choices about the scope 
96. Freedland & Kountouris, supra note 73.
97. Ibid at 22.
98. Ibid at 31.
99. Ibid at 35.
100. See Johnstone et al, Beyond Employment, supra note 73.
101. For an assessment of some Canadian examples, see Archibald, “Relative Autonomy,” supra note 
55.
102. Ibid at 20.
103. Ibid at 32, 370-371.
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and character of labour or workplace regulation, as mentioned, will be 
addressed below.
Before moving to the issue of normative standards, some attention 
needs to be given to certain scholarly and quasi-judicial attempts to address 
the second question: “which hirers of personal workers or which entities 
controlling, or having the ability to control, personal work relations ought 
to be held publicly responsible for ensuring that regulatory standards in 
labour markets are respected?” Once again, the literature is too vast to 
review comprehensively here, but some examples will serve to illustrate 
possible approaches and illuminate aspects of the normative dimensions 
in question. The Supreme Court of Canada has in two significant cases out 
of Quebec determined that a unified or monolithic notion of the employer 
may not respond to the need for fair labour market regulation. In the first, 
it found in 1997 that an employee provided to a unionized municipality 
by a temporary employment agency was employed by the municipality 
for purposes related to coverage by the collective agreement with its 
union, but also employed simultaneously by the temp agency for certain 
purposes under employment standards legislation.104 The Court held that 
where the traditional characteristics of an employer are shared by two 
separate entities, labour and/or employment tribunals are entitled to “fill 
the gap” to ensure employment protection for employees is enforceable 
against the appropriate employer entity that is within reach.105 More 
recently, the Court upheld a decision by a Comité paritaire, under the 
Quebec Act respecting collective agreement decrees,106 which decided that 
a nominal “franchisee” and “independent contractor” under a contract to 
provide cleaning services for public buildings was actually an employee 
of the purported “franchisor” and thus entitled to the minimum wages and 
benefits to be paid under the applicable collective agreement that had been 
extended by the relevant decree.107 The majority of the Court stated: 
“The presence of a franchise agreement cannot function to disguise the 
presence of a relationship between an ‘employee’ and a ‘professional 
employer’ as those terms are defined in the Act….To the extent that the 
reality of the relationship between the parties reveals that [the cleaner] did 
not in fact assume the business risks and had no meaningful opportunity 
to make a profit, that relationship is subject to the Decree.”108 
104. Pointe Claire (City) v SEPB, Local 57, [1997] 1 SCR 1015, 146 DLR (4th) 1.
105. Ibid.
106. CQLR, c D-2
107. Modern Cleaning Concept Inc v Comité paritaire de l’entretien d’édifices publics de la region de 
Québec, 2019 SCC 28 (3 May 2019).
108. Ibid at para 38.
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In some degree of parallel with the previous Pointe Claire decision, 
the majority in Modern Cleaning Concept found it significant that Justice 
Kasirer, in the Quebec Court of Appeal, had “properly characterized 
this business relationship as being tripartite in nature, since it involves 
three parties: the client requesting the cleaning services, Modern, which 
guarantees the quality and provision of the services, and the franchisee 
who actually performs them.”109 In this case, the putative franchisor 
made, under Quebec law, an “imperfect assignment” of the cleaning 
arrangements to the worker, by retaining its primary responsibilities to the 
client and tightly circumscribing the conditions under which the cleaner 
operated.110 The results in these two leading cases indicate a willingness on 
the part of majorities in the Supreme Court of Canada to take a “purposive” 
approach to interpretation of relevant employment statutes in order to 
step behind the formal contractual arrangements made by private parties, 
which thwarted the interests of workers that the statutes were meant to 
protect.111 However, in each case, the Court avoided the invocation of 
broad normative principles, which might be said to be instantiated in these 
decisions, and it avoided any reference to the scholarly analysis that might 
have justified such outcomes.
The foregoing Supreme Court of Canada cases at least point to a 
main potential focal point for the rectification of the problems caused for 
workers as a result of the fissured workplace: that is, a robust purposive 
interpretation of common employer provisions in labour and employment 
statutes. There is irony in the fact that the supposedly archaic common 
law seems in some measure to be in advance of the statutory law in this 
regard. Where an employer uses multiple corporate entities to conduct its 
affairs and attempts to avoid obligations to workers by denying control or 
responsibility on the part of the immediately employing entity under an 
employment contract, common law courts in Canada have for some decades 
been willing to pierce the corporate veil and find solvent controlling entities 
to be liable for its employer obligations.112 While many of these cases 
109. Ibid at para 39.
110. Ibid at para 42. There are  echoes here from the global controversies concerning whether “Uber” 
and other web-based service providers are actually “employing” their purported “contractors”: see 
Jeremias Prassl, Humans as a Service: The Promise and Perils of Work in the Gig Economy (Oxford: 
OUP, 2018).
111. While purposive interpretation has in some senses become “old hat” to Canadian lawyers, the 
Canadian example is being taken up as a progressive approach by labour and employment labours 
in other jurisdictions: see Guy Davidov, A Purposive Approach to Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2016).
112. Stacey R Ball, Canadian Employment Law (Toronto: Canada Law Book, 2014) § 4-1; Downtown 
Eatery (1993) Ltd v Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario, 200 DLR (4th) 289, 54 OR (3d) 161 
(Ont CA) [Downtown Eatery].
Up-dating Langille’s Insights with a Capabilities Approach 469
originated in the era of vertical and horizontal “conglomerate” integration, 
albeit using different corporate vehicles, there is no reason why the same 
principles should not apply in the new era of the fissured workplace, which 
relies upon tightly controlled subcontracting arrangements in complex 
supply chains to achieve the same ends—the evasion of labour standards. 
Canadian courts and tribunals have generated some infamous examples of 
the failure to take such a purposive approach,113 but there have been some 
counter examples evolving out of human rights cases in the employment 
context.114 Perhaps the most interesting examples of the direct use of 
common employer provisions to counter the evils of the fissured workplace 
occurred in the USA, where the National Labour Relations Board (NLRB) 
reversed its narrow interpretation of the National Labor Relations Act 
“joint employer” provision in two cases, which caused considerable stir.115 
However, the purposive doctrine developed in these cases by the Obama-
appointee majority NLRB was swiftly challenged by the Board when its 
membership became the fiefdom of Trump appointees.116 In this context, 
it may be significant to mention the virtually universal Canadian stance 
on occupational health and safety legislation, where a broad approach to 
shared or joint liability for industrial accidents is cast over virtually all 
persons or entities that have some degree of control over workplace safety: 
employers, sub-contractors, suppliers, employees, self-employed persons, 
owners, service providers, architects, and engineers.117 There is no reason 
why a parallel approach to common or joint responsibility could not also 
be taken in relation to a purposive interpretation of the scope of common 
employer provisions in labour and employment statutes. However, this 
begs the question of what normative principles should underpin such an 
interpretive exercise?
IV. Langille’s normative turn to the capabilities approach to human 
development and its implications for his claim that labour law is a 
subset of employment law
In response to this last question, Brian Langille has, in his most recent 
writing,118 turned to the “capabilities approach to human development” 
113. J Crew, supra note 91; Centennial Villa, supra note 90.
114. Robichaud v Canada, [1987] 2 SCR 84, 40 DLR (4th) 577 [Robichaud]; and United Steelworkers 
v Tim Horton’s, 2015 BCHRT 168.
115. Browning-Ferris Industries 362 NLRB No 186 (27 August 2015); and Miller & Anderson, Inc 
364 NLRB No 39 (11 July 2016).
116. Notice of the proposed rule change was first mooted by the Board on 13 September 2018, and 
made the subject of controversial consultations; similar action was taken by the US Department of 
Labour in relation to the Fair labour Standards Act in 2019.
117. See, for example, Occupational Health and Safety Act, SNS 1996, c 7, ss 13-23.
118. See his “Introduction: The Capability Approach to Labour Law—Why are we here?” and his 
470 The Dalhousie Law Journal
pioneered by Amartya Sen,119 and supported by the trail-blazing work 
of Martha Nussbaum,120 as the normative touchstone for a pragmatic 
yet principled foundation for labour and employment law in its largest 
sense.121  Moving beyond the 1981 “Subset” article’s reliance on Rawls 
and Dworkin, Langille has become a leader among an international group 
of labour and employment specialists who see the capabilities approach as 
a way out of the apparent dead-end faced by labour law in both theory and 
practice described above.122 Sen’s core insight for the human development 
approach is that freedom is both the end and the means to development, 
and that the context for improving  people’s capabilities to live lives they 
have reason to value are instrumental freedoms which Sen identifies as: (i) 
political freedoms, (ii) economic facilities, (iii) social opportunities, (iv) 
transparency guarantees and (v) protective security.123 As Langille says: 
“the focus is on the expansion of capabilities – that is, the improving of 
human lives by expanding the range of things that a person can do and 
be.”124 Langille emphasizes the Nussbaum anti-utilitarian position that: 
“the approach takes each person as an end, asking not just about total or 
average well-being, but about the opportunities available to each person.”125 
Thus, for Nussbaum, the capabilities approach “is focussed on choice or 
freedom, holding that the crucial good societies should be promoting for 
their people is a set of opportunities, or substantial freedoms, which people 
then may or may not exercise in action: the choice is theirs.”126 Langille 
also highlights Sen’s crucial distinction between a person’s “capabilities” 
and their “functionings.” While capabilities may represent a person’s real-
world opportunities, their functionings are what they have actually chosen 
to do or be. A useful corollary from Langille’s perspective is the distinction 
“Chapter 6: What is Labour Law? Implications of the Capability Approach” in Brian Langille, ed, 
The Capability Approach to Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); and his “Human 
Development: A Way out of Labour Law’s Fly Bottle” in Hugh Collins, Gillian Lester & Virginia 
Mantouvalou, eds, Philosophical Foundations of Labour Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2018) [“Fly Bottle”]. 
119. Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
120. Martha C Nussbaum, Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2011).
121. Langille had referred to Sen in his “Labour Policy” article in 2002, supra note 36, and it had 
become central to his thinking by the time of his Chapter 7 “Labour Law’s Theory of Justice” in Guy 
Davidov & Brian Langille, Idea of Labour Law, supra note 74.
122. Simon Deakin, Robert Salais, Ricardo Del Punta, Supriya Routh (all represented with chapters in 
his Capability Approach collection) and Alain Supiot, among others, are members of that international 
group. 
123. Sen, supra note 119 at 38-40.
124. Langille, “Fly Bottle,” supra note 118 at 91.
125. Ibid.
126. Nussbaum, supra note 120 at 18.
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between “fertile functionings,” that is, those which “tend to advance and 
promote other related capabilities,”127 and “deprivations” or “corrosive 
disadvantages,” which tend to limit other capabilities and therefore reduce 
a person’s possible range of functionings.128 Work, of course, can be either 
a fertile or a corrosive functioning, and in the view of many economists 
it is seen as simply the deployment of human capital. For Sen and indeed 
Langille, it is important to note that work-related capabilities go beyond 
the notion of “human capital,” but Langille nonetheless asserts that “labour 
law is best conceived as the part of our law that structures, and thus 
constrains or liberates, human capital deployment.”129 Langille continues, 
in line with Sen, that “the capability and freedom to work is intrinsically 
valuable as a substantive freedom in itself, and is also instrumentally 
valuable in attaining freedoms and choices in other areas of our lives.”130 
Thus, Langille concludes that, under the new normative framework of the 
capabilities approach, “labour law’s role can be seen as identifying, and 
removing, obstacles to the deployment of human capital in ways which 
optimise its intrinsic and instrumental role in lives lived.”131  In other words, 
the purpose of labour law is “the expansion of real capability to lead lives 
we have reason to value.”132 For Langille, then, the use of this normative 
framework in the purposive interpretation of labour and employment 
laws can incorporate and transcend their protective and human rights 
justifications, while aligning with a far reaching understanding of social 
and economic productivity and effectiveness.133
The foregoing paragraph provides a highly abstract encapsulation of 
the capabilities approach to labour and employment law from the new 
Langille perspective. It might be well, therefore, to briefly sketch some 
of the practical implications of the capabilities approach for the creation 
of a “new grammar and narrative” by which to understand the subject.134 
Broadly speaking, the capabilities approach, according to Langille, enables 
127. Langille, “Fly Bottle,” supra note 118 at 91.
128. For the notion of “corrosive disadvantage,” Langille relies on Jonathan Wolff & Avner deShalit, 
Disadvantage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 
129. Langille, “Fly Bottle,” supra note 118 at 92.
130. Ibid at 95. This of course, assumes that the work in question constitutes a relatively “fertile 
functioning” and is not an exploitative form of “corrosive disadvantage.”
131. Ibid at 96.
132. Ibid at 97.
133. Langille has long asserted that the protective and human rights justifications for labour law, by 
themselves, invite neo-liberal critiques that labour law constitutes a burden or tax on economic activity 
and disturbs natural forms of market competitivity and efficiency, and that the capabilities approach 
transcends such limitations: Langille, “Labour Policy,” supra note 36.
134. The concept of a “new grammar and narrative” for explaining labour law was first advocated by 
Langille in his “Labour Law’s Back Pages,” supra note 30.  
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one to avoid problems linked to the contract of employment by using the 
notion of capabilities and labour law’s purpose of removing obstacles to 
the deployment of human capital (i) to interpret labour and employment 
law statutes and (ii) to provide a basis for evolution of the common law. 
The narrow issue for a labour adjudicator using a purposive approach to 
his or her task must become, in Langille’s terms: “which person or entity 
is best able to remove the impediments to a fertile functioning which 
best deploys a worker’s capabilities.” Thus, the questions are not “Is this 
worker an employee?” or “Who or what entity is bound by a contract of 
employment?”, but rather “which person or entity who benefits from the 
efforts of the worker and influences the nature and conduct of the work is 
in the best position to remove the obstacles to effective deployment of the 
worker’s capabilities?” Langille, however, is not throwing out labour and 
employment law babies with the traditional bath water. He argues that 
“the great advantage of seeing ‘inequality of bargaining power between 
two contracting parties’ as simply one version of the general problem 
of (securing) just deployment of human capital is tied to our other main 
point … we do not need to tie ourselves to that particular account of 
employer/employee relationships.”135 
Langille thereby incorporates the protective justification for labour 
and employment law within the capabilities approach. Likewise, he argues 
that discrimination in employment is a corrosive disadvantage that inhibits 
the fertile functioning of work relationships, and that ought to be removed 
by the person or entity best placed to do so.136 From this perspective, 
the human rights justification for labour and employment law is also 
encompassed by a capabilities approach. It is thus apparent that Langille 
has moved well beyond notions of mere respect and concern for working 
citizens provided by a constitutional democracy in the sense of Rawls and 
Dworkin, and protection against gross economic exploitation. In this latter 
context, Langille agrees with Sen that it is fundamental that freeing people 
to advance their own freedoms is not to create persons who are passive 
recipients of benefits, but rather ensuring deployment of their capability to 
“help themselves and also influence the world.”137 In this regard, Langille, 
citing Paul Weiler, notes the significant difference between employment 
law, which externally sets standards to benefit workers, and collective 
135. “Fly Bottle,” supra note 118 at 101.
136. This was done by the Supreme Court of Canada in Robichaud, supra note 114, a human rights 
case which is a key focus of Langille, “Fly Bottle,” supra note 118.
137. Langille, “Fly Bottle,” supra note 118 at 94, quoting Sen, Development as Freedom, supra note 
119 at 18.
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bargaining law, which is intrinsically valuable to workers as “an exercise 
in self-government” and thus involved in a relational activity of making 
choices in concert with others.138
It is at this point in his recent writing that Langille  moves beyond the 
scope of formal labour and employment law or merely seeing the former 
as a subset of the latter. He says, 
“if we see labour law as underwritten by the idea of human freedom, we 
not only have a set of reasons for traditional labour law, but also for non-
contractual approaches to work relations (informality, for example) and 
for other non-traditional labour law subjects (unpaid work, education, 
child care, and so on).”139 
Once again, one might think that Langille is making common cause with 
those who see labour and employment law as a subset of what the Europeans 
see as social law, or others see as a broader notion of labour market 
regulation.140 This characterization would bring such areas as immigration 
law, tax law, social security law, pensions law, population policy laws, and 
the regulation of professions, to say nothing of occupational health and 
safety law and workers compensation, and a variety of other potential areas 
of formal legal regulation that impact workers.141 Langille might not take 
exception to such a list of subjects as falling within the regulatory sphere 
of a capabilities approach to labour law in the broad sense. However, that 
is not where he is going. Pointing to the work of Supriya Routh,142 Langille 
asserts that the human development approach “liberates us from contracts 
of various sorts” and “explicates a comprehension by labour law of the 
world built on informal work (the way in which the majority of workers 
throughout the world now find themselves working).”143 This opens up 
a huge area, which comes with its own set of definitional problems: 
“what is work?”; “who is a worker?”; “who is a controlling beneficiary of 
productive working efforts by others?” The realm of this inquiry takes us 
well beyond the “personal work relation” as conceptualized by Freedland 
138. “Fly Bottle,” supra note at 118, which echoes the quote noted above, from David Beatty in 
“Subset,” supra note 2, that “labour is not a commodity.”   
139. “Fly Bottle,” supra note 118 at 101.
140. Simon Deakin & Frank Wilkinson, The Law of the Labour Market: Industrialization, Employment 
and Legal Evolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Chris Arup, Peter Gahan, John Howe, 
Richard Johnstone, Richard Mitchell & Anthony O’Donnell, eds, Labour Law and Labour Market 
Regulation (Leichhardt, NSW: Federation Press, 2006); and Supiot, supra note 20.
141. See the table of contents of Arup et al, supra note 140, for a catalogue of potential inclusions to 
the list.
142. Supriya Routh, Enhancing Capabilities through Labour Law: Informal Workers in India (New 
Delhi: Routledge, 2014).
143. “Fly Bottle,” supra note 118.
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and Kountouris to say nothing of Langille’s original “labour law as a subset 
of employment law.” Thus, what is clear from Langille’s latest work, is that 
he has transcended the normative premises of “labour law as a subset of 
employment law” with its emphases on “concern and respect” as the twin 
normative pillars of labour law. Rather the capabilities approach provides 
Langille with a broad and deep theory of justice underlying appropriate 
forms of the regulation of work relations. Moreover, in the “Fly Bottle” 
article, he provides detailed and pragmatic analysis not limited to an 
articulation of abstract theory, and in his Capability Approach chapter he 
responds respectfully, but pointedly and credibly, to his critics. To revert 
to a now overworked phrase, Langille has gone well beyond “labour law 
as a subset of employment law.”144
Conclusion
In 1981, Brian Langille indeed wrote a path-breaking article explaining 
why labour law should, quite correctly, have then been seen as a subset 
of employment law. However, in those halcyon days of the late-welfare 
state, he could not have foreseen the dramatic changes in the labour 
market that would, in a certain way, lead to the banalization or unspoken 
general acceptance of his important insight some four decades later—
yet those changes render his initial insight somewhat peripheral to the 
world of labour and employment law’s new problems. But Langille has, 
for our benefit, kept his wits about him in the intervening period. He has 
perfected his craft and evolved his thinking in ways that could be crucial to 
leading us out of the wilderness into which regulating work has fallen.145 
The “human development through capabilities approach” to labour and 
employment provides an optimistic but pragmatic vision of how to get us 
out of “labour law’s fly bottle,” to pick up on Langille’s Wittgensteinian 
title. The bigger question which bedevils us all is this: how can we move 
from the realm of workable scholarly ideas to that of concrete social 
and political progress in entrenching a capabilities approach to work 
regulation in the Canadian, and global, legal and political environment? 
Two of my colleagues in this collective endeavour to assess Langille’s, 
and indeed this country’s, early approach to labour and employment 
law and its comparative evolution, have recently suggested that, in the 
European context, “sustainable democratic engagement” is critical to the 
144. See Supiot, supra note 20; and Johnstone et al, Beyond Employment, supra note 73.
145. Langille is not simply an “ivory tower academic” should skeptics wish to employ that pejorative 
label: he has put in his dues at the labour relations “coal-face,” being a respected labour arbitrator and 
mediator.
Up-dating Langille’s Insights with a Capabilities Approach 475
improvement of labour law “in the age of populism.”146 They call for a 
“re-constituted social contract…for a pluralistic [social] order.”147 I like 
to think that Canadians are privileged to live in a society where, at least 
in formal terms, our citizens have access to many of the constitutional 
and other arrangements that Bogg and Freedland see as institutional 
prerequisites to the kind of pluralistic polity which should be capable 
of re-creating fundamental rights at work, according to the capabilities 
perspective advanced by Langille.148 However, in the words of two of my 
dearest and, sadly now departed, labour law colleagues: “politics tells you 
more about labour law than law does.”149 
I commenced the conclusion to this paper in late autumn of 2019, 
at a time when populist provincial governments in two provinces had, 
in the name of “the people,” reversed labour standards reforms which, 
to some significant degree, ameliorated the problems addressed in this 
article; another province had invoked the Charter notwithstanding clause 
to limit the rights of public employees to wear religious symbols; and the 
leader of a federal “people’s party” had refused to disassociate himself 
from billboards urging voters to “stop mass immigration”—a specious 
labour-related issue, presumably raised to inflame and exploit racist 
sentiments for partisan political gain. Populist bile that was spilling over 
the 49th parallel from our “Neighbour to the South” seemed to be having 
an unfortunate political impact in Canada. A Canadian federal election 
had given the country a minority Liberal government that appeared to be 
potentially weak and out of touch with many voters, particularly in western 
Canada and Quebec. I was apprehensive about the growing predominance 
of illiberal populism, which is anti-worker from a capabilities perspective, 
while its adherents attempt to govern by exploiting the fears of working 
people. I said that a human development approach, which is rooted in the 
removal of obstacles to work as a fertile functioning and can improve the 
economy, is one that may be lost on neo-conservatives. 150 I opined that 
evidence-based policies, such as Keynesian economics or carbon pricing 
as ways to reduce greenhouse emissions, and, dare one say, something 
as complex as labour market regulation based on a capabilities approach 
146. Alan Bogg & Mark Freedland, “Labour Law in the Age of Populism: Towards Sustainable 
Democratic Engagement” in Julia López López, ed, Collective Bargaining and Collective Action: 
Labour Agency and Governance in the 21st Century (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019).
147. Ibid at 38.
148. See Bruce P Archibald, “Relative Autonomy,” supra note 55.
149. Professors Innis Christie and Dianne Pothier, both respected scholars in the domains of labour 
law, employment law, constitutional law and human rights, adhered to this adage…
150. Simon Deakin, “The Capability Approach and the Economics of Labour Law” in Langille, ed, 
Capabilities Approach, supra note 18.
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to human development, seem to be hard sells in the world of politics by 
“tweet.” But I now feel that I write, to some degree, in a different era. 
By the spring of 2020, parts of the world are beginning to believe 
that the first wave of the COVID-19 Pandemic has flattened and that anti-
pandemic lockdowns can be loosened. There has been a stunning sea 
change in political attitudes and actions in Canada, and it appears that 
almost all Canadian political “movers and shakers” have been converted 
to Keynesianism to some considerable degree. The Government of Canada 
and its provincial and territorial counterparts have re-discovered a kind of 
cooperative federalism that many thought to be a thing of the past151 in 
order to present a united “Team Canada” response to the pandemic. The 
head of the Canadian Labour Congress was reported to have met with the 
head of the Canadian Manufacturer’s Association to develop joint ideas to 
put to governments. The failure of international supply chains to be able to 
deliver emergency medical supplies has undermined support for globalism 
in economic affairs. Oligopoly in food production has created worrisome 
domestic shortages, while international travel restrictions have put the 
spotlight on agriculture’s dependence on migrant labour, for better or for 
worse. Working “virtually” from home has become so predominant that 
it may become permanent, transforming the organization of workplaces 
as we have known them. Dysfunctional labour market regulation linked 
to precarious employment and its attendant ills has been connected to 
shocking rates of death among elderly and vulnerable populations in 
long-term care facilities. Large sections of the public now apparently 
see that there is a role for the state in regulating not only public health 
issues, but related economic and labour market issues. Many jurisdictions 
have demonstrated that successful outcomes can be achieved by careful 
evidence-based policy implementation. In all of this union and business 
leadership has come to the fore, but there have been few if any adjustments 
to the collective bargaining regimes across Canada. The provincial and 
federal efforts at providing workers with support to get through the 
pandemic have been accomplished largely through regulatory changes 
to statutory employment law rules.152 Labour law specialists around 
the world are mobilizing to study these kinds of  changes.153 But those 
151. See Donald J Savoie, Democracy in Canada: The Disintegration of Our Institutions (Montreal 
& Kingston, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2019) for a pessimistic view of the capacity of the 
Canadian constitution to implement coordinated and sensible social and economic policies in a 
country fractured by regionalism.   
152. See David J Doorey, “COVID-19 and Labour Law: Canada” in (2020) 13 Italian Labour Law 
e-Journal, Special Issue 1,  online:  <https: //doi.org /issn.1561-8048/10843> [perma.cc/CCW9-
MRW4].
153. See the activities being announced through the global Labour Law Research Network (LLRN) 
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committed to “sustainable democratic engagement,” even in a time where 
the Achilles’ heels of populism have been revealed by the ravages of the 
pandemic, must re-double the efforts required to re-align social policy 
and labour/employment law with the needs of those hired in vulnerable 
personal work relations. These efforts are required to overcome the 
pitfalls of many fissured workplaces, which have shown themselves in 
the pandemic to be truly dangerous. One of the signal attributes of the 
Langille approach to capabilities and human development at work is that 
it transcends the limitations of outmoded left/right rhetoric to say nothing 
of the sterile platitudes of political debate that dominate the 24-hour news 
cycle media. Capabilities approaches have potential to be at the core of 
a new and hopeful politics of human development in a post-populist and 
post-pandemic era. The political stakes are high: we know that before the 
pandemic economic and social inequality were at levels not seen since the 
1920s and that such work-related inequality contributes to economic and 
political instability.154 This situation is exaggerated by the pandemic and 
the recession that it triggered. The mantra of the capabilities approach, of 
seeing labour and employment law as support for people by enabling them 
to choose to live lives they have reason to value, has never been more 
relevant. We all have reason to value Brian Langille’s evolving and helpful 
efforts in this regard.             
online: <www.labourlawresearch.net> [https://perma.cc/B7XT-PBZG].
154. Chrystia Freeland, Plutocrats: The Rise of the New Global Super-rich and the Fall of Everyone 
Else (Toronto: Doubleday Canada, 2012); Thomas Piketty, Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 
translated by Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014); 
Antony B Atkinson, InEquality: What can be done? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015); 
and Branko Milanovic, Global Inequality: A New Approach for the Age of Globalization (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 2016).
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